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1. INTRODUCTION
According to a popular, hardly contested viewpoint of nowadays Hungarian
economy needs an infrastructure-oriented development strategy in order to start a
growth path. The present study does not take this statement as an evidence and tries
to collect arguments for and against such a development policy.
Our preliminary assumptions that our survey based on are the following:
- there are several possible scenarios of international politics therefore it is an un-
reasonable choice to base all our future plans solely on picking up the most fa-
vourable one
- according to political scenarios we should think about which is a realistic one,
which one is truely favourable for Hungary on the long run and, moreover: what
infrastructure-development strategies are compatible with the indvidual scenarios
- it is indispensable to perceive infrastructure not only as a scalar factor to be
measured in economic dimension but as a spatial, vectorial factor too. It does
matter the creation of what kind of investments we want to promote under the
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slogan "more infrastructure". There are infrastructures whose establishment
would be harmful to the country and this can be proved by both economic and
extra-economic arguments.
2. COMPETING POLITICAL SCENARIOS
In the background of present Hungarian development strategies there lurks the
idea - sometimes tacitly sometimes expressis verbis - that the future of Europe is de-
termined for sure by the Maastricht process and Hungary's task is to join this process
- the sooner the better. (In the meantime we should gain their confidence by eminent
behaviour [i.e. behaviour they expect from us]).
We do not think it to be our task to analyse the whole three-pole world economic
system and the likely role of regions around individual poles. We only say that in our
opinion one might challenge all the three statements set in italics of the previous
paragraph. These are things what might happen but have alternatives which should
also be taken into account. One should acknowledge at the same time that at present
we have no mature alternative to them which would define another type of develop-
ment. But without thinking over the possible alternatives the actual hypotheses nei-
ther can be considered as matured.
What concerns the actual Hungarian situation, we sketch up five political sce-
narios as considered important for thinking about the infrastructural background.
They constitute desirable or undesirable alternatives of the future neither of which
can be excluded as totally irrelevant.
2.1. "Successful integration with Europe, closing the development gap"
This is the official strategy at present. This scenario thinks that the European in-
tegration process will be successful, and Hungary's aim should be to join the Euro-
pean Union as soon as possible.
2.2. "Unsuccessful, semiperipheric integration with Europe, with a subservient
economic role"
Naturally enough, this "Third World" type role is not our goal but we should
think about whether we can by sticking to the strategy of catching up avoid such an
outcome, i.e. to be a follower of and dependent on Western Europe [1]. Whether is it
not just our trying so hard to catch up what creates a situation whereby we build an
infrastructure appropriate for a follower model thereby cementing ourselves in a
game to the position of a constant loser?
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2.3. "Ideas about Central-European integration"
From time to time, when the environment of the Central-European region
changes and the future of the region becomes open for a historical moment, ideas
about regional cooperation, a confederation of the Danube-valley or some other form
of Central-European integration surface again. Miszlivetz [2] in his study mentions
several liberal thinkers who adhered in their 1989-90 enthusiasm to these ideas. At
the same time Péter Kende denounces the idea of federation as a beautiful dream
without substance, an antiquated notion from history. He summarizes his relating
opinion in six points, namely:
- the neceassary complementarity between the economies of the region's countries
does not exist, while
- as to the economic development level there are large discrepancies between
them,
- due to contested territories the states of the area cannot form a confederation,
- there is mutual distrust and disdain among them,
- there is no common language acceptable for all. Finally Kende
- challenges the meaning of an association outside the European Community when
the latter accepts new members only on an individual basis.
A special actuality is given to this problem by the fact that following an initial
euphory it is just the West now that requires a preliminary evidence on an Eastern
European internal ability to cooperate. When dealing with infrastructural networks
we shall return to the question that Western-European countries required as a pre-
condition of our attachment to the UCPTE system the proper functioning of the
common electricity system of the Visegrad countries.
Beyond ideas about purely Eastern Central-European integrations there are ideas
about East-West cooperation, a kind of combination of the former two. Here we can
include nostalgies about the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Pentagonale, and its
successor the Central-European Initiative. Its original idea was born in the enthusi-
astic atmosphere of 1989 when the difficulties of transition were not fully appreci-
ated; as a result of later developments Italy and Austria are now much more cautious
in their steps towards their Eastern neighbours; one may venture the opinion that
Eastern transformation speeded up the EFTA countries' flight into Europe.
2.4. "An antidemocratic coup"
Like the "Third World" model which preserves underdevelopment this too is an
undesirable scenario but cannot be dismissed out of hand.
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2.5. "A positive (environment-conscious) third way"
Finally we have the idea of a third way trying to avoid - relying on green theories
- the deadlocks of Western development, a strategy whose aim is not to imitate in-
dustrial societies. In moments of political upheaval both Western and local com-
mentators had their faith in the environment-consciousness of post-socialist people -
a forecast based on the mass assistance of several environmental movements. This
turned out to be an illusion, even more in the East there is no social readiness at pre-
sent to start a new experiment instead of copying Western examples. At the same
time it is plain that the winner on the long run will be he who takes the first step in
this direction: the real challenge of the age to find is not an infrastructure-
oriented but an environment-oriented development path.
*
To sum up the five models we can say that the first, the third and the fifth, are the
desirable, expected, positive scenarios, namely
- successful integration to, catching up with Europe,
- Central-European integration ideas and
- positive (environment-conscious) third ways -while the second and the fourth,
namely
- unsuccessful, semiperipheric integration to Europe with a subordinated eco-
nomic role and
- antidemocratic coup - are the undesirable, negative scenarios whose materializa-
tion however cannot be precluded.
The distinction is important since - as we will show in what follows - the spatial
system of infrastructures undoubtedly has a feedback on political scenarios. Whit-
hout assigning probabilities to individual scenarios or selecting a preferred variant it
should be plain for us that we ought to favour such infrastructure development which
eases the way for preferred scenarios and diminishes the chances for undesirable
ones. To be able to get closer to a possibility of such kind of selection, below we
shall search for links between the social-economic background of individual scenar-
ios and infrastructural systems appropriate for them.
3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL-
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES
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3.1. "Antidemocratic coup"
It will be practical to start the analysis with the infrastructural network of an an-
tidemocratic system.  Since the logic of infrastructure development of the past dec-
ades was analysed through and through it is commonplace by now that centralised
political control involves not only centralised distribution of resources but also infra-
structural networks similarly centralized in their spatial structure. There are dimen-
sions - the system of settlements, the county system, the transport network - where
inherited infrastructural networks were already centralised (as a remnant of the ri-
valry between Vienna and Budapest, then the capital of a much larger country than
today. In these cases the development after 1948 built on this existing structure while
newly created centralised structures where it found none - in education, health, trade.
Therefore one-sided is the statement which assserts that economic management sim-
ply neglected the development of infrastructure in the last four decades. We should
say rather that resources were given only to infrastructural developments serving
some political, power, strategic goal - linking the capital with county centres by road,
rail, multiple K-lines, (=exclusive used telephone lines) transmission of (central) ra-
dio and TV programs or the above mentioned "distributive" systems. At the same
time central management of resources could make it sure that certain goals never be
given the necessary money: public telephone, local papers, local studios, everything
what makes interpersonal communication easier and would reinforce local auton-
omy, ease the dependence on the center.
The same logic prevailed in international relation too. First there was the
autarchy, the closing down of many existing frontier station, wwhile on the other
side the preference of Soviet-Hungarian economic contacts - gas and oil pipes, elec-
tricity network, two-way electrified railway lines. This was in line with the trade ori-
entation but hindered contacts in other relations and preserved the unilateral depend-
ence of the economy.
It does not need special proof that an extremist, antidemocratic political turn
trying to liquidate multiple contacts would welcome such a centralised, closed sys-
tem and a re-estability of the corresponding infrastructure networks.
3.2. "Unsuccessful, semiperipheric integration to Europe with a subservient
role"
It is somewhat more difficult to see why the existing domestic infrastructural
network is a good basis for a semiperipheric, "Third World" type development too.
The projects and suggestions to "do away with the infrastructural backwardness of
Eastern countries" try to connect the centers of these countries - Budapest, Prague,
Moscow, Warsaw etc. - with Western Europe: through highways, high-speed rail-
ways, enlarged or doubled airports. This means that investments would keep on flow
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to and reinforce the centers of these countries exploiting that due to an earlier cen-
tralisation everything can be attained from here. The situation whereby everything
what is new enters the country through the center is reinforced. What remains for the
"countryside" is to fiddle on the road leading to the center. It might be always en-
larged somewhat but for something else there will be no money left. Thus there is no
way to create a new spatial structure quite the contrary: the present one is reinforced
and thereby the mode of distribution too is preserved - with the only not negligeable!
difference that now these capitals are turning not towards Moscow but towards Brus-
sels.
3.3. "The Central-European integration ideas"
The analysis above demonstrated that the more we are insisting on our "entry
into Europe" before everybody else and neglecting also the domestic needs for re-
structuring, the greater will be the chances that we create the infrastructure of an un-
successful, semiperipheric attachment instead of the infrastruture we need on the
long run. This constrained hurry makes competitors from our neighbours and blocks
contacts with them. This is especially useful for business circles trying to seize East-
ern-European markets for they can negotiate with the competitors one by one. Maybe
they might build up in three places the "central airport", the "distribution center" of
the area.
What concerns electicity, Western Europe does not want to export it: it wants
rather to rule out the possibility of Eastern-Central-European countries being de-
pendent on them - as they were on the Soviet Union. In this respect the Western in-
frastructure development strategy is different from that of transport ways necessary
for the export of production/consumer goods. Here not separate magistral lines to
Budapest or to Prague are bringing association nearer. UCPTE (the electricity system
of the Western countries) changed its statute in matters of admission. It no longer
examines new candidates one by one but forced the Visegrad countries all aspiring
for membership to prove first on their common network CENTRAL that they are
able to cooperate troublefree.  (The first trial was arranged at the end of September
1993, and since that time, due to the separation of the Ukrainian system the "trial has
been perpetuated" for a longer time).
It would be wise to think about what justifies that these same countries follow a
totally different, competitive strategy in case of the other infrastructures - trade net-
works included? At present there are two arguments against cooperation: one is the
already mentioned Western business interest in partitioning the market; the other is
the competition among the Eastern countries: every one of them wants to be center
(transit center, East-West go-between, trade center, financial center, market center,
touristic center, infrastructural center etc.) before and at the expense of the others.
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3.4. "Successful integration to Europe, with catching up"
The starting process of intra-European integration - at least the case of the Six,
later the Nine and the EFTA - was an example that countries which attained a high
level of development separately (n.b. partly by exploiting their colonies outside
Europe) can start an integration course after having built out their autonomous
structure. If this path might be imitated at all it can only through the development of
adaptivity, the transformation of internal structures, the building out of certain sta-
bilisation mechanisms before aspiring to association.
If, instead, development is restricted to the physical preconditions of attachment
then we will end up in the asymmetric, "Third World" type strategy which we called
in the above unsuccessful integration.  The present study defends a standpoint
whereby forceful integration of an underdeveloped and a developed structure
results in the rigidity of the underdeveloped, or its dependence and distortion so
that the benefits of the attachment are felt only on the developed side.
Concentrating our attention to the infrastructural aspect of the problem we
should stress the fact that we should first of all find out what type of networks con-
tribute most to the development of the country. In the next chapters we try to prove
the statement that this goal is best furthered by networks assisting local effort, mak-
ing local contacts more multilateral and dense - and not networks forcing them into
predetermined channels.
These networks are however not those magistral lines which would liquidate the
lacunae of East-West infrastructural links - high speed railways, highways, directed
pipelines. At least parallel with the development of magistral lines one should secure
similar resources for infrastructure required by internal restructuring. Otherwise in-
frastructure-oriented development strategy becomes a mere ideology for building
out the magistral lines needed by foreign investment and does not serve the catching
up efforts of the country.
3.5. "Positive (environment-conscious) third way"
For a thinking which stresses environmental values magistral infrastructural con-
structs are even more "suspicious": in this case not only the sequencing is questioned
but also the necessity of highways (good only for generating new travel needs).
Within this value system the reduction of unit and total energy consumption, econ-
omy with materials, recycling are all goals resulting at the same time in diminished
transport needs. Less travel is needed if local business potentials are better used, if
production and services are developed within human scale distances. All this is as-
sisted by a price system taking into account transport, travel, material and energy
consumption at their real cost.
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I do not want to go here into the details of the chances of the time needed for
such a value system to prevail either in developed countries or in Hungary. I want
only to stress the fact that environment-oriented economy too requires a certain kind
of infrastructure: and this infrastructure is in line with that dense local networks re-
quired by a more autonomous local economy.
*
To sum up the relationships between the five models and infrastructural struc-
tures we can assert that either of the positive, desirable models i.e.
- successful integration to Europe with catching up
- Central-European integration ideas and
- positive (environment-conscious) third way
all require a bottom-up infrastructural network making local contacts more dense and
connecting regions on similar level of development - whereas the development of the
two negative, undesirable scenarios, i.e.
- unsuccessful, semiperipheric integration to Europe in dependent role and
- antidemocratic turn
are more likely if we neglect the development of local infrastructures and reinforce
hierarchic, centralised infrastructural systems.
Social-economic scenarios and their evaluation have a direct impact on our
choice among infrastructure development strategies.
In what follows I shall turn to actual examples, those gained from transport, en-
ergy networks, from their international analyses and I shall distinguish magistral and
distributive type infrastructure systems presenting different impacts of these types.
4. TENDENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORKS
4.1. Tendencies in the development of European transport networks
Whereas nobody challenges the statement that infrastructural networks have an
impact on the region where they are located, it is difficult to find out what this im-
pact actually is. Plogmann [4], relying on spatial impacts distinguishes three main
interrelationships between transport and a region. (Figure 1.)
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      Source: Plogmann [4]
Figure 1. Transport links relative to a region
In the first case the infrastructure traverses the region without having any consid-
erable impact. (Highway with few crossroads, high speed railway without stations).
This is the pure corridor effect.  In the second case there is better contact between the
region and the outside world, but here it is important how many such opportunities
there are: peripheric regions are characterised by being stringed on one thread
whereas with more variegated, more dense contacts there is a crossroads effect. In
the third case depicted contacts within the region multiply what improves the internal
efficiency of the region [5].
Vickerman adds [5] that the above mentioned contacts may appear within the
same infrastructure as different tendencies. He himself drops in what follows the
point of view concentrating on physical vicinity and introduces two other points of
view: the functional position of the region and the eligibility for assistance. Both
criteria stress that the potential development of a region due to infrastructure is
largely determined beyond the infrastructure proper by the starting position of
the region concerned, namely its position within the larger environment and its
earlier development level. By varying these latter criteria the territory of European
Community might be divided into four catchment areas [5]:
- core areas, main agglomerations (London, Paris, Frankfurt, Cologne, Dusseldorf,
Amsterdam, Rotterdam etc.)
- "Shaded areas" between the above poles (Greater-London, Ile de France, Kent,
Northern Pas-de-Calais, a large part of Belgium, Limburg etc.)
- Rapidly developing new poles outside core areas (Eastern-England, Rhone-
Alpes, Stuttgart, Hannover etc.)
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- Finally the peripheries: Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Mid- and South-Italy, Spain,
Greece.
If we analyse further the internal development level of a given region we can
state that the same infrastructure has different impact on a more efficient and on a
backward region. Competitive producers gain through the new, long-distance contact
new markets.  while the producer providing in the past the relatively closed local
market gains new competitors. Although this might seem to result on the short run in
a favourable selection of producers which is good for the consumer the reduction of
local production results in loss of local jobs and thus in loss of purchasing power for
the local consumer on the long run. This makes the market unstable on the long run
even for the remote producer.
Despite recognising this and other important global factors it is a practical expe-
rience of the European Union that only those projects can survive which are promis-
ing direct, short-term benefit for some influential group - not least in the form of
large investment works. The indirect and longer-term - positive or negative - impacts
of transportation are not weighing much in the decision.
It is instructive for us how Vickerman when dealing with the West-European
practice (in [7] p.9) blames transport development strategies concentrating on trans-
port needs only. "The problem with the transport-oriented development of communi-
cation is that it tries to improve only the time parameter of network access. It stresses
inter-regional elements at the expense of intra-regionals and does not take into ac-
count the special features of economic structure within individual regions." We
should rather distinguish "non-spatial and spatial impact of communication infra-
structure. To the first belong the impacts of infrastructural investment on the aggre-
gate level of business activity of the region, on productivity and competitivity. Spa-
tial impact refers to the differences in performance (either between or within regions)
due to infrastructure." [7]
The analysis of non-spatial impacts relies on the perception of infrastructure as
public good. According to Biehl [8] "public goods" are characterized by the follow-
ing properties: indivisibility, non-substitutability, irremovability and parallel use by
several users. Dealing with local differences he says that one should measure not
only the level of provision with infrastructure but also infrastructure use relative to
the stock of private capital. In certain less developed regions there is outright over-
capacity of infrastructure due to a development policy which tried to compensate re-
gions with infrastructure. At the same time access to the region is not continuous,
crosspoints are scattered and therefore individual crosspoints gain importance - if
there are any crosspoints in the region at all. But even if there are crosspoints, a
characteristic of large-scale infrastructure is that a large group of both travellers and
non-travellers are benefitting from the service a large part of whom are living outside
the region (at other crosspoints or away from major lines) but the costs are fully born
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by those living in the given region. This means a certain redistribution among indi-
vidual regions and it is no more certain that benefits are reaped by those who built
the infrastructure on their territory.
4.2. Tendencies in the development of European natural-gas networks2
Even internationally, trade of natural gas only started in the early 60s: it first
meant the pipe connection between the Groningen natural gas fields in Holland and
the neighbouring countries, and an Algerian natural gas liquidizer constructed in
1964 using American technology together with the installation of the European re-
ceiving station. Soviet natural gas entered the European market in the next decade
from a pipeline built up to Germany. The major lines in Europe were constructed in
these three 'climatic' directions i.e. sources of the Atlantic, sources of the Mediterra-
nean and Soviet sources (Figure 2). This, at the same time meant the formation of
two different types of gas supplying systems.
The Atlantic distribution system is an organic development of local networks
relying on local sources, where - with some reminiscence of the operation of elec-
tricity networks - exports could be accounted for in the form of equivalent amounts
through chain-transactions between neighbouring areas.
Unlike the above, the main feature of the magistral system is the construction of
long, independent, large-diameter export target lines. It is built in cases where the
source country cannot itself finance the production, and its supply network is also
deficient. The user of the gas will then provide funds in order that the gas should
reach him/her after overcoming the local difficulties. While technically this is up-to-
date and it represents a high level of development, in the source country it results in
an enclave-like formation to produce and transport exclusively raw material greatly
independently from the local economy. This was characteristic of export departing
from both Algerian and former Soviet territories.
Figure 2 provides a good distinction of the three predominant destinations. Nor-
wegian gas from the North sea together with the Dutch gas is fed into the system
from the Atlantic. (In 1989 gas exports of these two countries totalled 60 billion m3).
From the south, besides liquid gas supplies already mentioned (this is how just about
yearly 16 billion m3 of natural gas arrives in Europe from Algeria), TRANSMED,
the 3000 km Algeria-Tunisia-Italy magistral pipeline was completed in the 80s. In
1989, it conducted 11 billion m3 of gas into Italy. Ukrainian-Russian gas comes from
the south through Slovakia and branches off in the Bratislava region to travel on to-
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wards the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, and Northern Italy. In 1989, a total of
100 billion m3 of Soviet gas exports was shared on a 50-50 basis by Western and
Eastern Europe. (Hungarian imports of the latter amounted to exactly 6 billion m3.)
Source: Mramurácz L.. [9]
Figure 2. Possibilities of diversification in the European natural gas pipeline
system
Natural gas supply systems reaching into Europe from various directions appar-
ently merge in German and Northern Italian soil. It was primarily the interest of
these two countries to secure the nearly 50 billion m3 German and just below 30 bil-
lion m3 Italian gas imports from several sides. Linkages to the pipe networks, how-
ever, make it possible even for other countries to lift the one-sidedness of that import
possibility now that the distributive use of magistral axes may take place on a conti-
nental scale.
4.3. Tendencies in the development of European electricity networks
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In Europe five major electricity systems are operating: UCPTE linking the conti-
nent's countries on the West side of the former iron curtain, NORDEL bringing to-
gether the Scandinavian countries, the UK system operating on the British iles, UPS
embracing the former Soviet Union and IPS uniting the other former socialist coun-
tries. The latter two were linked up to the recent past, with a centralised, centrally
managed dispatcher-service and making use of possibilities to carry electricity to
long distances. On the borderline of the "Eastern" and the "Western" system the iron
curtain was reproduced on the level of technology: two separate systems even if op-
erating with the same frequency.
Characteristic UCPTE NORDEL MIR
Population [million] 300 23
170
Area [1000 km²] 2280 1260 1628
Built-in capacity [1000 MW] 371,1 83,4 172,4
Maximal performance [1000 MW] 220 49,1 121,9
Max.performance/built-in cap [%] 59 % 59 % 71 %
Electricity production [billion kWh] 1400 338,4 811,4
from this
by thermal power station [%] 42,9 % 17,5 % 78,4 %
by nuclear power station [%] 36,9 % 28,0 % 16,8 %
by hydroelectric station [%] 20,2 % 54,5 % 4,8 %
Electricity production [kWh/cap] 4700 14700 4800
Network 220kV and above [1000 km] 150 27,4 92,6
Source: Kucherov-Rudenko-Voropai [11]
Table 1.  Characteristics of large European electricity systems in 1988
The Western system is decentralised: UCPTE, NORDEL and the UK system are
insulated from one-another by a rectifying valve. Decentralised management prevails
within individual systems too, based on the principe that individual countries should
provide for a balanced production and use of energy. Although export and import of
energy is possible it is regulated by bilateral contract between the parties concerned
and guarantees to this effect might be included into country balances. Decentralised
operation is backed by severe quality prescriptions and quantity obligations. These
obligations concern partly the network (every defaulting section should be replaced)
and partly the existence of capacity reserves both within power stations (to be con-
nected within seconds) and in the network (to be connected within minutes, auto-
matically). Considering that the share of power plants older than 20 years is below
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10% in the UCPTE and around 50% in the IPS/UPS, the chances for breakdown are
larger on the latter side. [10]
The size of larger systems is demonstrated by Table 1.  Comparative data for the
East refer to MIR which in 1988 embraced beyond the Eastern-European countries
also the Ukraine and Moldova.
Changes of last years naturally had an impact on the mentioned networks and
even more on ideas about the future. The West- and East-German systems were
linked through four 380kV lines. Thereby the Polish and the Czechoslovak network -
and through them the Eastern system - acquired a direct-current link to UCPTE.
Hungary already in summer of 1990 - first among the Eastern countries - an-
nounced its intention to join the UCPTE system. But soon representatives of the
neighbouring Czech, Slovak and Polish electric power systems has also announced
their intention to join the UCPTE. In UCPTE's earlier practice the preparation of the
feasibility study has been taken by the neighbouring countries relating always a sin-
gle candidate. .Beginning with 1992, however, UCPTE has changed its procedure
and is now managing the joining of all the four countries. So in that respect the
Visegrad cooperation actually came live in the framework of CENTREL, the coop-
eration of the Hungarian, Slovakian, Czech, and Polish electric power systems. The
four systems have to form a four-sided autonomous operation splitting off the
Ukrainian system. The main objective is to prove their independent operating and
controlling capabilities. On the one hand, this is a constraint in the sense that Russia,
which formerly did the adjustment across the whole CDU network declines to con-
tinue doing so; and it is sensible on the other hand, as UCTPE does not undertake
this obligation either, since it sets the proof of the independent working abilities as a
condition to joining. (By the way, satisfying this condition is easier than the condi-
tion whereby the four countries should prove their ability to work separetly from
each other.) The systems test has already been started in 1993 (29-30th of Septem-
ber). As a result of the adverse energy situation within the CIS the test run had to be
prolonged: the CENTREL functioned as a seperate system.
There are technical, efficiency, security and political considerations about the
feasible future trends relative to large electricity systems. From a purely technical
perspective large, centralised networks are feasible and they have efficiency gains
(individual countries need less reserve capacities). This idea would be in line even
with the Maastricht spirit. It is undeniable at the same time that the growth of benefit
decelerates beyond a certain network size: and if economies with precarious stability
are included this raises risk.
Consequently the Aachen RWTH [12] suggests a trans-European electricity sys-
tem up to the Ural composed as a network of medium-sized units (Figure 3.). Indi-
vidual units to be linked would be of the size of the Iberian peninsula, France, Ger-
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many; or the four-country network of CENTREL. The project divides the European
part of CIS into four similar size units.
Source: RWTH, Aaachen. [12]
Figure 3: The outlines of a connected electricity system after 2000
This idea is in line with the distributive conception of networks already men-
tioned which would link larger self-sufficient regions. In the same time the concep-
tion requires as a condition the existence of such large, balanced regions. If some-
where this condition is missing the import expected from a distance becomes inse-
cure. Therefore the Aachen institute supplemented its conception to a socalled hybrid
solution: in order for Western-Europe to have a secured electricity import from Rus-
sia (the Smolensk-region) a separate, direct-current link should be established be-
tween the two endpoints (Figure 4) spanning the deficitary Ukrainan region. Even
more is revealed from the nature of such magistral elements by the suggestion to add
to the electricity generating capacity of Western-Europe a 10 or possibly 20 GW unit
feeded by Kongo precipices [13].
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Source: RWTH, Aaachen. [12]
Figure 4: Hybrid connection in the European electricity system: high voltage
direct current Euro-link
4.4. Summary: tendencies in the development of European networks
Let us return to Figure 1 (on page 9) where we distinguished three different
types of traffic relative to a narrow region: transit which is just going through the
region, external link providing for traffic into and out of the region and region intern
provision.
These types of link have a historical order. In the case of public roads sideways
inherited the network of roadways linking villages. This was enhanced in the first
half of this century by highways linking major cities and intended already for pas-
senger cars, finally in the second half of the century speedways appeared which by-
pass cities and link economic regions.
In the case of gas networks there were city networks since the turn of the century
and regional pipes since the thirties. In smaller countries this regional network be-
comes international in the sixties and in the seventies magistral networks appear.
Parallel to this was the development of electricity networks. According to the
German development [12] electricity generated in the household appeared at the turn
of the century, city-wide networks came with World War I., from the thirties we find
links between settlements and from the fifties large, connected electricity systems.
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Let us mention that this was a link between distributive systems. Magistral lines
were developed gradually in coming decades.
(In Hungary the first public use city electricity generators were established in the
1880s (Temesvár 1884, and Mátészalka on the country's present territory in 1888). In
Budapest electricity supply began in 1893. In the 1930s power plants were still iso-
lated and supplied smaller regions with electricity without cooperating. The first
long-distance transmission line was established in 1929 and was used for railway
electrification between Bánhida and Budapest. Gradually a unified national network
did emerge and by 1963 the supply of Hungarian settlements with electricity became
universal [14]. The internationalisation of the network was started in 1952, with a
link between the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak network. This was followed in
1958 by a link with Yugoslavia and in 1962 by the first Soviet-Hungarian long dis-
tance transmission line. In 1963 the Hungarian electricity system was attached to the
unified system of the CMEA. Beyond that since 1968 there is a mutually advanta-
geous, regular exchange of electricity between Hungary and Austria).
With all these networks it is a development of the last decades that large-
capacity, magistral network components did appear serving not regional but
interregional circulation. In their case transit character is not accidental (the traveller
either stops or proceeds on his way) but a built-in technological parameter. And there
is often such a huge difference in economic development level between the end-
points that the presence of the magistral line certainly means quite different things
for one end and the other. In the case of transport we stressed the importance of local
receptivity. In the case of the gas pipe we mentioned it might be not by chance that
the pipe line arriving from Algeria through South-Italy and that from the Soviet Un-
ion through Eastern-Europe are of magistral type. In the case of electricity networks
it has a quite symbolic meaning that proposed transmission lines both from Russia
and Kongo are for direct current (what certainly does not mean technically that cur-
rent can flow in one direction only).
If we return to Figure 1. with its transit, accessing and internal traffic it is strik-
ing that we left out a "link" whose importance is growing: namely the "transit" which
does not even cross the border of the region: the bypassing traffic (Figure 5).
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   Source: After Plogmann [4] with own supplements
Figure 5: Transport links relative to a region
Nowadays regions on different level of development increasingly have to suffer
transit totally alien to them, with no benefit only cost. Increasingly is thus argued
that such kind of lines (ways) mean the export of contamination with mainly non-
monetary costs - remarking that even monetary part of the costs are not offering to
these regions from benefit accrueing at points of access.
5. ECONOMIC, REGIONAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
5.1. Non-spatial impacts
As we have seen earlier (p.11.) foreign literature divides the impact of infra-
structure into spatial/nonspatial (this is more or less equivalent to our vecto-
rial/scalar differentiation). If we want to go further into the details of such impacts
we have to include into spatial impacts the bulk of the impact on environment, on the
regional economy and on local politics, whereas the non-spatial group embraces
mainly economic, macroeconomic elements (regionally integrated economic indica-
tors, competitivity, productivity, employment etc.).
We could observe that when speaking about infrastruture-oriented economic
policy, development strategy,  than arguments for concentrate on macroeconomic
factors. This is natural since what concerns the aims we are speaking about economic
policy which is a macroeconomic category. It would be one-sided however to ex-
clude thereby an inadmissibly large part of effects related to infrastructure the driv-
ing force behind processes.
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The most frequently used arguments for infrastructure development are the fol-
lowing:
– Faulty infrastructure is an obstacle to production/services therefore to do away
with shortages in indispensable for economic growth
– Infrastructure development is not import-intensive and this is favourable for the
domestic economy and the trade account
– The development and operation of infrastructure is labour-intensive which is fa-
vourable for employment
– Infrastructure development releases high demand within the production sphere,
favours certain subcontractors and thereby starts a boom of the economy.
One cannot say in general that these statements are true or wrong. Under
Keynesian economic policy it is true that any state investment, be it military prepa-
rations, the building of a government residential district or jails has similar trickle-
down economic impact but this does not make the above goals appealing. One can-
not spare to make a similar evaluating distinction within infrastructure too and weigh
the actual impact of individual objects.
In case of certain infrastructure types the above mentioned policy goals do not
come through at all. The largest investments, due to their high technology level em-
ploy few labour,  they are capital- and import-intensive,  their trickle-down effect
shows up abroad (cases of metro-, high speed train-, nuclear power plant-, highway
constructions, telephone exchanges). Some are nevertheless needed but we should
not mix their support with inappropriete general arguments.
Naturally as with any investment, with the above mentioned large, capital-
intensive infrastructural investments too there are interest groups, sometimes whole
industries who are interested in the realisation of these establishments. These groups
try to involve state resources, acquire state guarantees. This would be made easier by
laying down the general principle that infrastructural investments in general are
preferred, subsidized, assisted. But there is no such a principle, on the contrary, there
are infrastructural establishments which are, analysing their substance oughtright
harmful, whose establishment should be explicitly opposed or delayed by central and
local government. Matter of fact evaluation and decisionmaking cannot be replaced
by general principles precisely in case of the largest investments.
5.2. Spatial impacts
From among the spatial factors the general pro-infrastructure argument singles
out and generalises one, namely the goal of becoming a regional center.
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In this century Budapest and the country were not very often an appealing target
but the largest part of the eighties was such a positive period. Not because then it
would have been a high priority goal to become a regional center, quite the contrary:
at that time the country followed a comparatively liberal, comparatively market-
oriented and comparatively dissident path relative to its environment. It was simply
the change in local circumstances what made it attractive: as a result of an in-country
regulation a region was defined whose center, one can say, was Budapest.
In the politics of the nineties priorities were reversed: Budapest and its antago-
nists alike would all like to have a central role and seek its outside preconditions, not
least infrastructure, Western aid, investor, capital. The physical content does not
matter, what matters is that it should come "to us" not to another capital (or district
on a local level). The abtract idea of "regional center" is as inhuman as are the in-
dustrialised magistral networks: only we did not realise up to now that to build world
trade centers in a residential district is as devastating as to run a highway or a pipe-
line through the apartment houses. The residents are under increasing pressure in
both cases and it turns out sooner or later that they are - together with their apartment
- just a troubling factor in a larger game.
What concerns infrastructural networks in chapter 4 we reviewed the impact of
dictributive and magistral networks, the role of their "developed" and "underdevel-
oped" end upon spatial development. Georgraphy of transport gives an even more
comprehensive classification for transport networks that is worthy to look over.
When dealing with regional impact of transport infrastructure we have to distin-
guish first between two parts of transport ways: open sections which have first of
all negative impact on the region concerned whereas positive regional impact may
emerge on points of access.  There was a gradual, historic shift from everywhere ac-
cessible transport ways towards transport ways having sparsely scattered but con-
centrated crosspoints.
Crosspoints are classified by geography of transport into primary, secondary
and tertiary. Primary are the points whose importance is determined by their geo-
graphic location (gate, cape, col). Crosspoints where transport flows meet are secon-
dary, whereas crosspoints created by the operative functions of transportation belong
to the tertiary group. Nowadays both the magistral ways of transportation and the
crosspoints created by them increasingly have an industrial/mass-production charac-
ter and accordingly are separated from the areas for everyday life (housing, recrea-
tion, shopping, education, leisure etc).
Traditional communication relates from a functional point of view in three ways
to a given area: it either reveals the area from inside (provision), collects transport
heading towards it (access) or passes through a region (transit). Lately in the rela-
tionship of busy ways and locality a fourth function has emerged: namely that the
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transit flows have no direct contact with the area: (bypassing). We have no "hard"
statistical data for the evaluation of the degree of bypassing but we have to call the
attention to the fact that in the evaluation of regional development environmental
factors have an increasing role and in this respect it is not the larger traffic but the
smaller one that is preferable.
6. SUMMARY
The starting point of our paper dealing with advantages and drawbacks of infra-
structure-oriented development strategy is that one should not base economic policy
on the assumption that the best hoped political strategy will undoubtedly prevail.
From among the five possible scenarios evaluated with the three positive ones simi-
lar infrastructural networks are attached: all of them can be characterised that they
try to ease the centralisation of the networks and promote internal, regional devel-
opment with a kind of restructuration. In the same time just the scenarios to be
avoided would be promoted by reinforcing the existing, hierarchic, centralised infra-
structure network structures. In such a situation the paper express a definite stand-
point: it is not enough to be for infrastructure orientation in general, since while con-
structing networks contributing to restructuration have an urgent need, the develop-
ment of other and opposite kind of structure-preserving networks would be explic-
itely harmful.
Our differentiation gained from political scenarios is in line with the experience
to be gained from the analysis of the state and development tendencies of existing
large European structures - gas, transport and electricity networks. Distributive net-
works able to secure sufficient local privison are a sufficient basis for the crosspoint
effects of larger, magistral networks to have positive impact on the area. On the other
hand in underdeveloped, ill-provided regions magistral networks easily can produce
enclave-like, Third World type effect raising rather torsion in than promoting devel-
opment and thereby rather coserving instead of liquidating backwardness. Only a
cautiously and selectively initiated infrastructure oriented economic policy taking all
the above mentioned facts into account might serve as a development alternative for
the country.
January 31, 1994.
22 INST. FOR WORLD ECONOMICS OF THE HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
7. REFERENCES
[1] Vitányi Iván: Kelet forradalma (Revolution in the East) Valóság, November 1990
[2] Miszlivetz Ferenc: Közép-Európa és az Európába vezetô út. (Central-Europe and the road lead-
ing to Europe) Manuscript, without date (December 1990?)
[3] Kende Péter: Kell-e nekünk Közép-Európa. (Do we need Central Europe?) Századvég, spec.
number without date (1989?)
[4] Plogmann, F.: Die Bedeutung der Verkehrsinfrastruktur für das regionale Entwicklungspotential.
Beitrage zur Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen und zur Raumplanung 664, 1980 Münster. Quoted
by Vickerman [5]
[5] Vickerman, R. W.: Other regions' infrastructure in a region's development. Lecture held at the
30. European Congress of Regional Science Association International, Istambul, August 28-31.
1990.
[6] Vickerman, R. W.: Transport infrastructure in the European Community: new challenges, re-
gional implications and evaluation. Lecture held in the British section of Regional Science Asso-
ciation International Liverpool, September 1990.
[7] Vickerman, R. W.: Transport infrastructure and region building in the European Community.
Journal of Common Market Studies 1994/1 and lecture on the 33. European Congress of Re-
gional Science Association International Moscow, August 24-27. 1993.
[8] Biehl, D.: The role of infrastructure in regional development, in infrastructure and regional de-
velopment. Ed.: Vickerman, R. W. European Research in Regional Science vol.1. Pion, London,
1991.
[9] Mramurácz Lajos: A földgáz szerepe és helye a nemzetközi kereskedelemben. (The role and
place of natural gas in international trade.) MVM Rt  Közleményei 1992/1
[10] Materials of the Working Group of experts of UNIPEDE/UCPTE on the interconnection
East/West. 1990/1992. pp 178-189 in: The World Energy System: European Dimensions, East-
West. Proceedings from the Second International Symposium on The World Energy System, Bu-
dapest, October 1992.
[11] Kucherov, J. N.,- Rudenko, J. N.,- Voropaj, N. I.: Analysis of Principles, Problems and Condi-
tions for Creating the European Power System pp 155-168 in: The World Energy System: Euro-
pean Dimensions, East-West. Proceedings from the Second International Symposium on The
World Energy System, Budapest, October 1992.
[12] Kreusel, J.: Basic and Actual Questions Concerning the Extension of Interconnected Power Sys-
tems Manuscript. Institute of Power Systems and Power Economics Aachen University of Tech-
nology. Lecture on The Third International Symposium on The World Energy System,
Uzhgorod, November 4-7. 1993.
[13] Smol'nikov, S. V.,- Aleksandrov, G. N.,- Opoko, T.: The Possible Development of an European
Electric Energy System and its Ties with African and Russian Power Systems pp. 201-209 in:
The World Energy System: European Dimensions, East-West. Proceedings from The Second In-
ternational Symposium on The World Energy System, Budapest, October 1992.
[14] A magyar villamosenergia-ipar 25 éve 1945-1970. (25 years of Hungarian electricity industry
1945-1970, Hungexpo, Budapest, 1970.
January 31, 1994.
CONSIDERATIONS ON AN INFRASTRUCTURE-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT 23
CONSIDERATIONS ON ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF AN
INFRASTUCTURE-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Tamás Fleischer
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 1
2. COMPETING POLITICAL SCENARIOS .......................................................................................... 2
2.1. "SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE, CLOSING THE DEVELOPMENT
GAP"............................................................................................................................ 2
2.2. "UNSUCCESSFUL, SEMIPERIPHERIC INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE, WITH A
SUBSERVIENT ECONOMIC ROLE" .................................................................................. 2
2.3. "IDEAS ABOUT CENTRAL-EUROPEAN INTEGRATION"............................................... 3
2.4. "AN ANTIDEMOCRATIC COUP" ................................................................................. 4
2.5. "A POSITIVE (ENVIRONMENT-CONSCIOUS) THIRD WAY" .......................................... 4
3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL-ECONOMIC
STRUCTURES.............................................................................................................................. 5
3.1. "ANTIDEMOCRATIC COUP"....................................................................................... 5
3.2. "UNSUCCESSFUL, SEMIPERIPHERIC INTEGRATION TO EUROPE WITH A
SUBSERVIENT ROLE".................................................................................................... 6
3.3. "THE CENTRAL-EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IDEAS" ................................................... 6
3.4. "SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION TO EUROPE, WITH CATCHING UP"................................ 7
3.5. "POSITIVE (ENVIRONMENT-CONSCIOUS) THIRD WAY" ............................................. 8
4. TENDENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURAL NETWORKS .................................. 9
4.1. TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORKS ............ 9
4.2. TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN NATURAL-GAS NETWORKS ........ 11
4.3. TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY NETWORKS .......... 13
4.4. SUMMARY: TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN NETWORKS ............. 17
5. ECONOMIC, REGIONAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE ............. 19
5.1. NON-SPATIAL IMPACTS............................................................................................ 19
5.2. SPATIAL IMPACTS .................................................................................................... 20
6. SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 22
January 31, 1994.
